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Michael Harrington and Simon Dennis
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Input-driven models provide an explicit and readily testable account
of language learning. Although we share Ellis’s view that the statisti-
cal structure of the linguistic environment is a crucial and, until re-
cently, relatively neglected variable in language learning, we also
recognize that the approach makes three assumptions about cogni-
tion and language learning that are not universally shared. The three
assumptions concern (a) the language learner as an intuitive statisti-
cian, (b) the constraints on what constitute relevant surface cues,
and (c) the redescription problem faced by any system that seeks
to derive abstract grammatical relations from the frequency of co-
occurring surface forms and functions. These are significant assump-
tions that must be established if input-driven models are to gain wider
acceptance. We comment on these issues and briefly describe a dis-
tributed, instance-based approach that retains the key features of
the input-driven account advocated by Ellis but that also addresses
shortcomings of the current approaches.
Frequency plays a role in language learning both as an attribute of individual
experience (task frequency) and as an attribute of the linguistic environment
(feature distribution frequency). Both are observable entities that lend them-
selves to formal models of learning and processing. The effect of task frequency
in learning is readily evident in the well-established relationship between
practice and skill development (Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981). Practice of a
particular form or structure will typically lead to increased facility in using
that knowledge, an outcome Schmidt (1992) called “knowledge-strengthening.”
The role played by the distribution of linguistic features is more contentious.
In the approach sketched out by Ellis, the frequency with which specific lin-
guistic forms are distributed in the input determines how fast and well these
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forms are learned. Task frequency and distribution frequency can, of course,
be related. All things being equal, forms that appear in the input more often
will be practiced more often. However, Ellis argues for a wider role for distri-
butional frequency in learning—that is, as the basis for predicting the devel-
opment of new language knowledge. Frequency is assumed to thus play a
quantitative and qualitative, or “knowledge-changing,” role in language learn-
ing (Schmidt). This is a theoretically richer but far more controversial claim.
The input-driven approach advocated by Ellis is represented in connection-
ist models (Elman, 1993; Redington & Chater, 1998) and most widely known in
SLA via the Competition Model (Sasaki, 1994; MacWhinney, 1997). These mod-
els ascribe a primary, explanatory role to distribution statistics: The proba-
bilities of occurrence of specific form-function mappings in the input predict
learning outcomes. The most controversial aspect of the approach is the as-
sumption that these form-function mappings are learned solely via associative
learning mechanisms (Lachter & Bever, 1988). These are deemed sufficient for
language learning in general and for the development of higher order syntactic
knowledge in particular. The approach denies the need for an abstract level
of syntactic representation, which places it at odds with the standard view
that assumes abstract syntactic rules are essential for capturing structure-sen-
sitive syntactic relations, such as long-distance dependencies (Fodor & Pyly-
shyn, 1988). It has been generally assumed that this autonomous syntax is
innately specified in important respects.
Although contentious, the input-driven approach advocated by Ellis is at-
tractive in a number of ways. The associative learning processes assumed to
underlie the approach provide a well-understood transition mechanism ac-
counting for how the learner develops increasing knowledge of the language
(Gregg, 1996). The approach also makes a serious commitment to understand-
ing the structure of the learning environment and the role it plays in learning.
The incorporation of the structure of the learning environment in the learning
account distinguishes input-driven approaches from alternative accounts in
which learner-internal linguistic and cognitive processes have been the pri-
mary focus and the nature of the input is assumed rather than tested (Smith,
1997). This is the case for generative approaches (Epstein, Flynn, & Martohard-
jono, 1996), where input has been characterized as a largely unspecified trig-
ger of development, and for interactionist accounts that emphasize the learner’s
modification of the input as the basis of learning (Long, 1996). Finally, the in-
put-driven approach makes minimal assumptions about the role of innate ca-
pacities in the explanation of language learning (Elman et al., 1996).
In short, the input-driven approach provides an explicit and readily test-
able account of language learning. Although we share Ellis’s view that the sta-
tistical structure of the linguistic environment is a crucial and, until recently,
relatively neglected variable in language learning, we also recognize that the
approach makes three assumptions about cognition and language learning
that are not universally shared. The three assumptions concern (a) the lan-
guage learner as an intuitive statistician, (b) the constraints on what consti-
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tute relevant surface cues, and (c) the redescription problem faced by any
system that seeks to derive abstract grammatical relations from the frequency
of co-occurring surface forms and functions. These are fundamental assump-
tions that must be established if input-driven models of learning are to be suc-
cessful.
THE LANGUAGE LEARNER AS AN INTUITIVE STATISTICIAN
Input-driven models of learning assume that the individual keeps track of the
frequency of occurrence of specific distributional properties of the input.
These properties include where a particular linguistic form occurs, the forms
with which it co-occurs, and the frequency with which it occurs, both alone
and in combination with other forms. The approach is based on a probabil-
istic model of human inferencing that assumes that decisions are made and
actions undertaken based on a computation of probabilities and utilities. It
emphasizes probability as a description and norm for human behavior (Giger-
enzer & Murray, 1987). The individual learner is assumed to actively compute
the probability of a given outcome based on available cue strengths and to
make a judgment on interpretation that best satisfies the strengths of the vari-
ous cues presented.
The evidence that individuals encode frequency as a matter of course
comes from studies demonstrating that people can be extremely sensitive to
frequency of occurrence information in performing tasks that make use of this
information, either implicitly or explicitly (Hasher & Zacks, 1984). Research in
the Competition Model framework has shown that the speed at which individ-
uals learn and process a specific form-function relationship reflects the fre-
quency of various cues in the language. For example, cues such as word order,
case marking, and animacy can correlate to express agency (MacWhinney,
1998).1
Although there is considerable research indicating that individuals are sen-
sitive to frequency of events, there is also evidence that use of frequency in-
formation is not the automatic occurrence that Ellis suggests. Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) demonstrated that judgments of frequency can be affected
by heuristics, or systematic biases in judgment. In the study, subjects were
asked to judge whether each of five consonants appeared more frequently in
the first or third position in English words. Nearly two-thirds of the subjects
judged the first position to be more likely despite the fact that all five conso-
nants appeared more often in the third position. The authors attributed the
outcome to an availability heuristic that systematically biased the responses
(e.g., retrieval of words that begin with k- is easier than retrieval of words in
which -k- is the third letter).
Evidence for a role in judgment behavior for both frequency information
and heuristics has yet to be adequately resolved. A recent proposal suggests
an evolutionary basis for which type of knowledge might be employed (Hert-
wig, Hoffrage, & Martignon, 1999). Individuals may count features when it is
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necessary to meet adaptive goals, which is attested by evidence that infants
are highly attuned to making frequency-based phonetic discriminations (Saf-
fran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996) but not in settings that involve more strategic
processing. Whatever merit this proposal may ultimately have, it is evident
that individuals use both heuristics and frequency information in processing,
and any account of language learning will have to accommodate this fact (Be-
ver, 1992).
DEFINING THE PERCEPTUAL EVENT:
WHAT CONSTRAINS CUE COUNTING?
The idea that the individual counts features in the environment, whether im-
plicitly or explicitly, assumes that the relevant features are countable. As a
model of learning alone, it is unconstrained. The world can be divided into an
infinite number of discrete events, and there must be some way to focus on
what is important. The physical and social environment certainly plays a role
in framing what is salient and needs attending to. Brase, Cosmides, and Tooby
(1998), for example, made an argument for natural units of analysis (e.g., faces
and whole objects) that have conferred some adaptive advantage on humans.
However, stipulating a natural unit of analysis for language is difficult pre-
cisely for the reasons that have traditionally been advanced for abstract syn-
tax: What you see is not all that you get. The problem of cue constraint is
directly related to the redescription problem to be discussed.
Cue-counting approaches must also deal with the role of attention in pro-
cessing. Although the process appears to be largely implicit, it is also recog-
nized that some attention must be paid to the stimuli for it to register, and
this attention is more than just passing awareness. You are not able to pro-
vide an estimate of the number of red cars that passed you on the way to
work this morning, but you were aware of them enough not to let any of them
hit you. Research that has attempted to identify minimum levels of attention
suggests that the individual must attend to a specific object for more than two
seconds for it to register in such settings (Johnson, Peterson, Yap, & Rose,
1989). Input-driven approaches need to incorporate an attentional component
in cue learning and specify how it interacts with frequency information.
LEARNING STRUCTURE: THE REDESCRIPTION PROBLEM
The greatest challenge facing input-driven models of learning is accounting for
the development of abstract syntax based on the associative learning of the
distribution of surface features alone. Since the early critiques of behaviorism
by Chomsky (1959) and others, linguistics has been dismissive of any substan-
tial role for associative learning in language development, a perspective readily
evident in the SLA literature (see, e.g., Eubank & Gregg, 1995). To make a com-
pelling case for associative learning as a knowledge-changing mechanism, in-
put-driven models must demonstrate the learners’ capacity to learn from the
statistical regularities in the input.
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There are two ways in which these regularities can be extracted from the
input. The first way is driven by the simple statistical distribution of forms.
Collocations are an example of such statistical regularities. These regularities
can be extracted directly from the input through the calculation of relative
frequencies of occurrence of forms. The second way in which regularities can
be extracted from the input is indirect. These patterns represent higher order
structural relations and can only be extracted by some kind of systematic
transformation of the input data. Regularities such as the long-distance de-
pendencies governing pronominal reference cannot be learned by reliance on
co-occurrence statistics alone. As is evident in the example sentences, there
is nothing in the distribution statistics of the words that reflects the structural
relationship between Mary and she in (1).
(1) a. Mary watched television before she had her dinner.
b. Before Mary had her dinner she watched television.
c. Before she had her dinner Mary watched television.
d. *She watched television before Mary had her dinner.
The ability to learn these relations depends on a mechanism for recoding,
or the “redescription,” of the raw input into more abstract representations
(Clark & Karmiloff-Smith, 1993). The ultimate success of the approach will de-
pend on demonstrating how this recoding occurs. An important connectionist
landmark in this endeavor was Elman’s work modeling subject-verb agreement
and cross-clausal dependencies using a simple recurrent network (Elman,
1990, 1993). The use of a simple recurrent network enabled him to simulate
temporal order, which permitted the network to learn simpler forms before
more complex ones as well as incrementally increase the memory space avail-
able in learning. By starting small, the system was able to first develop the
primitives of noun and verb from the input and then use the knowledge to
drive the redescription into higher order structures. Elman thus established
the capacity of a connectionist model to capture, at least in principle, the re-
coding of the statistical input into higher level representations (see Marcus,
1998, for a critique).
However, connectionist models like the simple recurrent network still have
a number of serious problems as models of language learning. They are diffi-
cult to scale to substantive portions of a language, both in terms of the size
of the vocabularies they can accommodate and the number of grammatical
structures they can capture. As a consequence, testing is confined to small
networks applied to strictly limited domains. Also, rather than use naturally
occurring language, special training sets must be assembled (Ellis & Schmidt,
1998). These training sets are meant to capture the critical statistics of the
language but typically are constructed based on the experimenter’s assump-
tions about language statistics rather than rigorous corpus analysis. This may
make scaling an unachievable goal and the models untestable.
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CAPTURING STRUCTURE FROM INPUT:
TESTING INPUT-DRIVEN APPROACHES
The tenability of input-driven accounts of language learning is ultimately an
empirical question. One solution proposed to address the issues raised here
is the development of hybrid models that assume abstract representations
but also incorporate distributed representations (Jurafsky, 1996; Smolensky,
1995). Although these models combine the strengths of both the symbolic and
input-driven approaches, they can also push back the problem of learning in
that syntactic structure is assumed as a given (e.g., Jurafsky).
Instance-based approaches to cognition (Hintzman, 1986; Hummel & Holy-
oak, 1997) are an attractive alternative to these approaches for several rea-
sons. Instance-based learning is based on the incorporation of individual
instances of each learning event, and memory retrieval processes play a cen-
tral role in processing and learning. Instance-based models provide a partial
solution to the cue constraint problem in that they assume a string (e.g., utter-
ance) is encoded as a unit. They also retain the desirable features of connec-
tionist learning models—in particular, minimal assumptions about preexisting
syntactic knowledge—but do not encounter scaling difficulties that beset con-
nectionist models like Elman’s simple recurrent network. In contrast to these
models, training occurs by appending instances to memory rather than by
applying a learning algorithm like the gradient descent optimization proce-
dure. This aspect of instance-based accounts is particularly important for
models of language learning in which scaling is a critical issue.
However, current instance-based theories of sentence processing are sym-
bolic in nature and generally not capable of extracting grammatical class infor-
mation from the input stream alone. Typically, they operate on part-of-speech
tagged text for which significant syntactic groupings such as noun phrases
have been identified prior to the application of the model (Argamon-Engelson,
Dagan, & Krymolowski, 1999), or they require a database of already parsed
text fragments from which to generalize (Scha, Bod, & Sima’an, 1999).
Instance-based approaches have been applied to a number of language
phenomena, including the learning of prosodic (Nakisa & Plunkett, 1998) and
lexical knowledge (Goldinger, 1998). We are developing an instance-based
model of learning that learns structure directly from the statistical distribu-
tion of forms in natural linguistic input. It retains the strengths of the input-
driven approach described by Ellis but does not assume preexisting structural
representation nor is subject to the scaling problems faced by connectionist
models. The Syntagmatic Paradigmatic (SP) model characterizes sentence pro-
cessing and learning as the interaction of three memory systems that operate
on distributed, instance-based knowledge representations (Dennis & Harring-
ton, 2001). These memory systems are lexical, syntactic, and relational, each
playing a distinct but complementary role in interpretation.2 The interaction
of three dedicated memory traces with distributed, instance-based knowledge
representations means that the model can capture the systematic nature of
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language use from natural input without the need for the type of global syntac-
tic representations that define the generative accounts of learning (Harring-
ton & Dennis, 2000), and it does so in a way that makes direct use of frequency
information in the input.
NOTES
1. Ellis emphasizes the individual as feature counter, but counting in the Hasher and Zacks frame-
work and that in the case of the Competition Model are different. In the former, feature frequencies
are recorded often unconsciously and retrieved directly (Hasher & Zacks, 1984). In contrast, the
Competition Model assumes that individuals keep accurate tallies of cue validities for a particular
variable (e.g., who is the subject of the sentence) as it correlates with other variables (occurring
before the main verb, being animate, receiving nominative case marking, etc.). Thus, the task for the
individual in the Competition Model framework is to track both individual event frequencies and
their co-occurrences. It also requires a means by which to identify the various cues.
2. A lexical trace is defined as the paradigmatic associate of a word across the corpus. A syntac-
tic trace is the set of syntagmatic associations within a sentence. A relational trace is the set of
paradigmatic associations within a sentence. The relational trace is an extraction of the predicate
information contained in the sentence. The model uses the retrieved syntactic and relational work-
ing-memory representations as a set of constraints on sentence interpretation and employs a gradi-
ent descent procedure to resolve these constraints. A detailed description of the model is available
at: http://www.uq.edu.au/humanfactors/people/s.dennis.
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